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I. 1999 TEXAS LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
HE 1999 Texas Legislative Session experienced much "tweaking"
of the Education Code, correcting issues which came to light in the
years after the 1995 Legislative Session, during which the Educa-
tion Code experienced a major overhaul.
A. OPEN MEETINGS, PUBLIC INFORMATION
One example of an issue which arose after the major legislative over-
haul involves the applicability of the Texas Open Meetings Act and the
Texas Public Information Act to Texas' charter schools. House Bill 2111
resolved this and other issues. Open enrollment charter schools are now
* Partner, Bracewell & Patterson, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas. The author thanks the fol-
lowing associates of Bracewell & Patterson, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas, for their invaluable assis-
tance: Dianna D. Wojcik and Marianna M. McGowan.
1. See Tex. H.B. 211, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
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explicitly made subject to the Texas Open Meetings Act and the Texas
Public Information Act.2 Further, a person who has been convicted of a
felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude is no longer eligible to
serve as an officer or member of the governing board of an open enroll-
ment charter school.3 Interestingly enough, this standard is now higher
than the standard for an officer or member of a school board trustee,
which has no such restriction for moral turpitude misdemeanors. 4 Open
enrollment charter schools may also, through a higher education board,
issue revenue bonds to finance or refinance education or housing facili-
ties to be used by the school. 5
A highly significant legislative act, House Bill 156,6 amended the Texas
Open Meetings Act and the Texas Public Information Act. The most sig-
nificant revision of the Open Meetings Act expanded the definition of a
"meeting" to include a gathering conducted by a governmental body at
which a quorum is present and at which the members receive information
from or give information to a third person, including an employee of the
governmental body.7 The practical effect of this revision is to repeal the
former "staff briefing" exception. Therefore, school district and college
boards may no longer meet in closed sessions to hear administrative of-
ficers provide them information which is not listed specifically on the
agenda. However, the drafting of this provision has already raised some
questions, prompting the Texas Attorney General to interpret this statu-
tory revision. The Tarrant County District Attorney asked the Attorney
General whether this new provision in effect repealed the ability of gov-
erning boards to conduct "open forum" or "staff briefing" sessions in
public meetings, since all subject matters in a meeting, including subjects
presented by a third person, now require advance agenda notice. The
Texas Attorney General ruled that because it would be impractical, if not
nearly impossible, for a school board to give prior notice of agenda items
when members of the public came to present information or complaints,
specifying merely "open forum" on an agenda would be appropriate pro-
vided the school district is unaware of the subject matter of the citizen's
presentation to the board.8 However, if the school board is aware of the
subject matter of the citizen's presentation, then the school board should
specifically list the agenda topic.9 As for staff briefings in open session,
the Attorney General ruled that because the governing body has more
control over the employees, the specific subject matter of their presenta-
tions must be included in the agenda.' 0
2. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.105(b) (Vernon 2000).
3. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.120 (Vernon 2000).
4. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.061(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000); TEX. ELEC. CODE§§ 11.002(4), 141.001 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
5. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 53.48 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
6. Tex. H.B. 156, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
7. See TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 551.001(4) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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The Texas Public Information Act, House Bill 211,11 made it clear that
a school district or open enrollment charter school must now appeal,
within thirty days of receipt of an Attorney General's open records, deci-
sions regarding a student's records when the student's parents make the
request.12 The statute also limited the school district or charter school's
rights to appeal the district court's decision on the matter involving the
student's records. 13
House Bill 211 added an informer's privilege, which now allows a
school district or open enrollment charter school to keep confidential the
name of a student or employee who reports a civil, criminal, or regulatory
violation.' 4 This legislation also allows a school board to meet with an-
other governmental entity if the boundaries of the entity are located en-
tirely or partially within the school district's boundaries. 15
In this new age of high technology, the Texas Legislature added Senate
Bill 12516 to allow governmental bodies to broadcast open meetings over
the internet.17 "A governmental body that broadcasts a meeting over the
Internet shall establish an Internet site and provide access to the broad-
cast from that site."' 18 The governmental body must provide, on the in-
ternet site, the same notice of the meeting that the governmental body is
required to post under the Texas Open Meetings Act.19 The notice must
also be posted within the same time limits as the Texas Open Meetings
Act. 20
Senate Bill 185121 made a large number of technical changes to the
Texas Public Information Act and the Texas Open Meetings Act. The
Texas Public Information Act now states that a court cannot order a
school district to withhold a category of public information unless that
category of information is made expressly confidential by other law.22
In order to provide some additional confidentiality to protect the integ-
rity of economic development activities, Senate Bill 185123 also added a
provision to the Texas Public Information Act stating that unless and un-
til an agreement is made with a business prospect, information related to
any financial incentive provided by a school district is exempted from
disclosure.24 If an agreement is made with the business prospect, the fi-
nancial or other incentive offered by the district, and any other financial
incentive offered by another person involving public funds, may then be
11. See Tex. H.B. 211, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
12. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 26.0085(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
13. See id. § 26.0085(c).
14. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.131 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
15. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 26.007(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
16. Tex. S.B. 125, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
17. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 551.128(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
18. Id. § 551.128(c).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Tex. S.B. 1851, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
22. See TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 552.022(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
23. See Tex. H.B. 1851, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
24. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.131(b) (Vernon 2000).
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subject to disclosure.2 5
Senate Bill 185126 provided an exception to the Open Meetings Act to
allow a school board to conduct a closed meeting for economic develop-
ment negotiations. A school board may now deliberate in closed session
about commercial or financial information that it receives from a business
prospect that the board wants to aid in locating, remaining, or expanding
in or near the district, and with which the board is conducting economic
development negotiations.2 7
Senate Bill 185128 amended the litigation or settlement negotiation ex-
ception of the Texas Public Information Act to specify that litigation in-
formation is excepted only if litigation is pending or reasonably
anticipated on the date the information is requested.29 The provision
which previously excepted settlement negotiations was specifically
deleted.30
The Public Information Act now requires that the district's public in-
formation officer must display a sign describing the public's rights and
responsibilities to inspect and obtain public information in a district's ad-
ministrative offices, plainly visible to the public and district employees. 31
The General Services Commission has a copy of that sign on its website. 32
Under Senate Bill 1851, governmental entities may also require a de-
posit on copies if the charge is estimated to exceed $50 or $100, depend-
ing on the number of full-time employees in the entity.33 For the first
time, the Legislature has authorized certain charges for "inspection only"
requests, as opposed to the previous requirement which only applied to
"copy" requests. 34 A district can also give a requestor notice that a re-
quest will result in a charge of more than $40 for information requested,
along with an itemized statement of expenses.35 If the requestor does not
respond, the request is considered dismissed.36 A requestor must re-
spond and agree to pay the costs in order to continue the public informa-
tion process. 37 A governmental body that requests an Attorney
General's opinion on the release of public information must inform the
requestor, within ten business days after receiving the request, that the
district is withholding the requested information and has asked for an
Attorney General's opinion. 38 The district must give the requestor a
25. See id. § 552.131(c).
26. See Tex. H.B. 1851, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
27. See TEX. Gov"r CODE ANN. § 551.086 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
28. Tex. S.B. 1851, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
29. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.103(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
30. See id. § 552.103(a).
31. See id. § 552.205.
32. Texas General Services Commission (visited Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.gsc.state.
tx.us/openrecords/pia.html>.
33. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.263(a) (Vernon 2000).
34. See id. § 552.271.
35. See id. § 552.2615(a).
36. See id.
37. See id. § 552.2615(b).
38. See id. § 552.301(d).
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copy of the opinion request to the Attorney General. However, the
school district may redact information that it believes to be confidential. 39
The amendment to the Public Information Act also states that if an
individual's proprietary information may be subject to certain public in-
formation exceptions, the district must make a good faith attempt to no-
tify the person whose proprietary information is involved. 40 That person
then has the right to correspond with the Attorney General regarding
disclosure of the information, on his or her own behalf.41 The Attorney
General now only has forty-five working days to provide a response to a
request for an opinion regarding a request for public information, rather
than the previous sixty working days.42 However, if the Attorney Gen-
eral cannot meet the forty-five-day deadline, then the Attorney General
must notify the governing body in order to obtain an additional ten
days.43
A person who claims to be a victim of a Public Information Act viola-
tion, including a requestor making a claim against a district, may sue for
injunctive or declaratory relief.44 A thirty-day statute of limitations has
been added for districts to bring suit to challenge an Attorney General
decision.45
B. TAMPERING WITH GOVERNMENTAL RECORDS
House Bill 92646 amended Texas Penal Code § 37.10(c)(2) so that tam-
pering with a public school record, report, or assessment instrument, such
as the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills ("TAAS") exam, constitutes
a felony.47 An offense for tampering with a public school record is now a
third-degree felony unless the intent was to defraud or harm another,
which constitutes a second-degree felony.48
C. JUNIOR COLLEGES
House Bill 241549 clarified a junior college district board of trustee's
ability to establish and operate branch campuses, centers, or extension
facilities within the district's service area. "Before any course may be
offered by a public junior college within the service area of another oper-
ating public junior college, it must be established" to the Texas Higher
Education Coordinating Board "that the second public junior college is
not capable of or is unable to offer the course." 50 A board of trustees
39. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.301(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
40. See id. § 552.305(d).
41. See id. § 552.305(b).
42. See id. § 552.306(a).
43. See id.
44. See id. § 552.3215.
45. See TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 552.324(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
46. Tex. H.B. 926, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
47. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.10(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
48. See id.
49. H.B. 2415, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
50. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 130.086(d) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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may accept, purchase, or rent land and facilities in the name of the junior
college district in the district's service area in order to establish and oper-
ate branch campuses, centers, or extension facilities.51
In an amendment to the Education Code provided by Senate Bill
135252 provides that if a school district agrees, a public junior college may
offer a course in which a high school student may enroll and receive both
high school and junior college course credit, regardless of whether the
high school credits fulfill the student's graduation requirements. 53
Senate Bill 167054 states that if a student is fully enrolled in an accred-
ited secondary school, in a program leading toward a high school di-
ploma, or enrolled in courses for joint high school and junior college
credit, family court may render an original support order or modify an
existing order providing for child support past the eighteenth birthday of
the child. 55
D. PERSONNEL
Senate Bill 456 has finally clarified the process by which a probationary
contract employee is notified of the school district's decision not to offer
the employee a contract for the next school year.57 Previously, a Board
was required to give notice of "intent" to terminate a probationary con-
tract at the end of the contract term. The statute was amended to delete
the word "intent" and to make it clear that the employee will be notified
of the board's "decision" to terminate the employee's probationary con-
tract. The Legislature thus contemplates now clearly a one-step, as op-
posed to a two-step, process58
House Bill 26959 amended Texas Education Code § 22.006 based on
issues which arise regarding jury service by public school employees. Pre-
viously, school districts were not required to provide paid leave in addi-
tion to accumulated personal leave for an employee to serve on a jury in
state court. However, beginning with the 1999-2000 school year, school
districts must provide school employees with state jury service leave. 60
School districts may not discharge, reduce the salary of, or otherwise pe-
nalize or discriminate against, a school district employee who complies
with a jury summons in state court.61 Non-salaried school employees
must receive their daily pay while serving on the state jury.62 School dis-
tricts may not reduce an employee's accumulated personal leave for state
51. See id. § 130.086(c).
52. Tex. S.B. 1352, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
53. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 130.008 (a)(i)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
54. Tex. S.B. 1670, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
55. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
56. Tex. S.B. 4, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
57. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.103(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
58. See id.
59. Tex. H.B. 269, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
60. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.006 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
61. See id. § 22.006(a).




A much-heralded new statute is House Bill 341,64 which added Texas
Labor Code Chapter 103. The new law extends, for the first time, statu-
tory protection to employers or former employers who give references
for their former or current employees. Employers, or their authorized
employees, may provide "information about a current or former em-
ployee's job performance to a prospective employer of the current or for-
mer employee on the request of the prospective employer or the
employee. '65 "Job performance" information relateds to the manner in
which the employee performs, and can include "attendance at work, atti-
tudes, effort, knowledge, behaviors and skills."'66 Those who provide job
performance information are immune from civil liability or any damages
caused by the disclosure, unless the employee or former employee pro-
vides clear and convincing evidence that the employer knew at the time
of the disclosure that it was false or that it was made with malice or reck-
less disregard for its truth or falsity.67 However, despite the significant
immunities, an employer is still not required by statute to provide an em-
ployment reference. 68
House Bill 61869 modified Texas Education Code § 21.057. Beginning
with the 1999-2000 school year, when a school district assigns an uncerti-
fied or inappropriately certified person to teach a class for more than
thirty consecutive instructional days during that school year, the district
must provide written notice to the parents of students in that class.70
That parental notice must be provided within thirty instructional days of
the assignment of the teacher.7' Uncertified or inappropriately certified
teachers include those serving on emergency permits and those who do
not hold any certification.72 The terms do not include teachers serving on
temporary classroom assignment permits, a hearing impairment certifi-
cate, or a school district teaching permit; teachers certified under an alter-
native certification program; or those who are employed under a
certification waiver granted by the Commissioner of Education.73
It is now a Class C misdemeanor for a school district employee to
knowingly sell, market, or distribute the use of dietary supplements that
contain performance-enhancing compounds to students with whom the
employee has regular contact as a part of the employee's regular school
63. See id. § 22.006 (c).
64. Tex. H.B. 341, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
65. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 103.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
66. Id. § 103.002(3).
67. See id. § 103.004(a).
68. See id. § 103.005.
69. Tex. H.B. 618, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
70. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.057(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
71. See id. § 21.057(b).
72. See id. § 21.057(d).
73. See id. § 21.057(d)(2)(A)-(F).
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district duties.74 House Bill 342075 adds this provision to Texas Education
Code § 38.011. The list of performance-enhancing compounds includes
stimulants, amino acids, hormone precursors, herbs, or other botanicals
or substances other than vitamins or minerals, that are intended to in-
crease athletic or intellectual performance, promote muscle growth, or
increase endurance and capacity for exercise. 76 A school district em-
ployee, however, is not prohibited from providing or endorsing the use of
such dietary substances by that employee's child. 77 Furthermore, a
school district employee is not prohibited from selling, marketing, distrib-
uting, or endorsing the use of dietary supplements by students as a part of
activities that take place away from the school property and school-re-
lated functions, and that are entirely separate from the school district em-
ployee's employment and which do not in any way involve information
about or contacts with students that the employee has had access to
through any aspect of his or her employment.78
Senate Bill 112879 made numerous revisions to the Texas Teacher Re-
tirement System, including increasing the multiplier, 80 increasing monthly
annuities with the fourth and final phase of the Consumer Price Index
catchup, increasing monthly annuities, making new distribution options,81
and providing for a new lump sum death benefit for an on-duty physical
assault which causes death.82
Athletic trainers are now regulated as a result of Senate Bill 1233,83
which amends Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 4512d. Athletic train-
ing includes preventing, recognizing, assessing, managing, treating, dis-
posing of, and reconditioning athletic injuries under the supervision of
either a licensed physician or other licensed health professional author-
ized to refer a patient for health care services. 84 The Texas Advisory
Board of Athletic Trainers is also authorized to refuse to issue a license,
and to suspend or revoke the license of any athletic trainer or applicant
who provides services outside the scope of the practice of athletic train-
ing. 85 This statutory construction comports with a recent Fifth Circuit
decision, in which the Court of Appeals held that athletic trainers are
"professionals" under the Fair Labor Standards Act and are, therefore,
74. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 38.011(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
75. Tex. H.B. 3420, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
76. See TEX. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 38.011(d) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
77. See id. § 38.011(b).
78. See id. § 38.001(b)(2)(A)-(C).
79. Tex. S. B. 1128, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
80. See TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 824.203(a), (e) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
81. See id. § 824.2045.
82. See id. § 824.402.
83. Tex. S.B. 1233, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
84. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4512d § 1(3) (Vernon Supp. 2000). But see
TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 451.001 (Vernon Supp. 2000).




exempt from overtime pay.86
House Bill 82687 established the Government Dispute Resolution Act,
which allows every governmental body, including school districts, to de-
velop and use alternative dispute resolution procedures to resolve dis-
putes.88 The Act does not authorize binding arbitration.89 These new
procedures supplement, but do not limit, other dispute resolution proce-
dures available to a governmental body.90
E. COMPETITIVE PURCHASING
House Bill 226091 corrected what appeared to be an oversight in previ-
ous statutory revisions to the competitive purchasing laws. Texas Educa-
tion Code § 44.031(h) allows the board of trustees of a school district to
contract to replace or repair school equipment, a school facility, or part of
a school facility that undergoes major unforeseen operational or struc-
tural failure.92 A large number of other changes were made to clean up
provisions involving competitive purchasing of contracts.
Senate Bill 66993 amended numerous provisions of Chapter 44 of the
Texas Education Code. Among the many changes, the legislation re-
moved from the list of methods of competitive purchasing a request for
proposals for construction services. However, the Legislature also added
a method: a job order contract for the minor construction alteration or
repair of a facility.94
Senate Bill 669 also states that the notice of time and place for bids,
proposals, or responses to requests for qualifications must now also in-
clude a notice of when these items will be opened. 95 Public advertise-
ment for a two-step procurement process must be published only once.96
This bill also amended Texas Education Code section 44.031(h) to state
that the board of trustees may use contracting methods other than those
listed under the competitive purchasing statute for the replacement or
repair of school equipment or part of a school facility that undergoes ma-
jor operational or structural failure because of an unforeseen catastrophe
or emergency. 97 All of the purchasing and contract laws of Chapter 44
have now been specifically made applicable to junior college districts.98
86. See Owsley v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'g
denied, 199 F.3d 441 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1423 (2000).
87. Tex. H.B. 826, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
88. See TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. ch. 2009 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
89. See id. § 2009.005(c).
90. See id. § 2009.052(a).
91. Tex. H.B. 2260, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
92. These contractual methods include methods other than those listed in Education
Code § 44.031, which detailed competitive purchasing methods. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 44.031(h) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
93. Tex. S.B. 669, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
94. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 44.031(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
95. See id. § 44.031(g).
96. See id.
97. See id. § 44.031(h).
98. See id. § 44.0311(a).
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A board of trustees may delegate to a designated person, representa-
tive, or committee the board's authority regarding actions authorized or
required to be taken by the district for competitive purchasing. But the
board may not delegate an action required to be taken by the board it-
self.99 When obtaining construction services, the district must provide
notice of the board's delegation and the board's limitations established
on that delegation in the request for bids or proposals.100 If the district
fails to provide the notice, a ranking selection or evaluation of bids for
construction services is only advisory. 101 A court may enjoin perform-
ance of a contract made in violation of any provision of Texas Education
Code Chapter 44.102 An interested party may bring an action for an in-
junction 0 3 and the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees.' 0 4
Senate Bill 669 also states that when a school board is considering a
construction contract, it must decide which method of competitive
purchasing provides the best value for the district before it advertises. 10 5
After receiving bids or proposals, the district must select an offer based
on statutory criteria and publish in the request for bids, proposals, or
qualifications the specific criteria that it will use to evaluate the offerors
and the relevant weights, if they are known at that time, the criteria will
be given.106 "The district must document the basis of its selection and
must make the evaluations public not later than the seventh day after the
date that the contract is awarded."' 0 7
A large number of technical changes were made to the laws regarding
construction contracts. In design/build contracts, for example, the statute
now makes specific provisions regarding the qualification and selection of
designers/builders of school district facilities s08 The amount and suffi-
ciency of payment and performance bonds are also clarified in the
statute.10 9
Construction manager-agent contracts have also been revised in the
statutes as a result of Senate Bill 669. The statute now specifies the types
of services that a school district can require of a construction manager-
agent . 10 An architect or engineer is prohibited from serving as a con-
struction manager-agent unless the architect or engineer serves as the
construction manager-agent under a separate or concurrent procurement
99. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 44.0312(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
100. See id. § 44.0312(a).
101. See id.
102. See id. § 44.032(f).
103. See id.
104. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 44.032(f) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
105. See id. § 44.035(a).
106. See id. § 44.035(b).
107. Id. § 44.035(c).
108. See id. § 44.036(e).
109. See id. § 44.036(j).




Construction manager-at risk contract issues have also been clarified
under Senate Bill 669. "The district's engineer, architect, or construction
manager-agent" is prohibited from serving "alone or in combination with
another, as the construction manager-at risk."'1 12 The statute clarifies that
the district is responsible for selecting a construction manager-at risk in
either a one-step or a two-step process. 113 Selection criteria must be con-
tained in the request for proposals or the request for qualifications." 4
"At each step, the district shall receive, publicly open, and read aloud the
names of the offerors." 5 The district must also "read aloud the fees and
prices, if any, stated in each proposal as the proposal is opened. 1" 6 The
legislation also requires a ranking and selection process which must be
completed within forty-five." 7 Once a construction manager-at risk is
employed and begins work, the construction manager-at risk must pub-
licly advertise and receive bids or proposals from contractors or sub-con-
tractors.118 The contents of a bid or proposal must not be disclosed to
any person not employed by the construction manager-at risk, the engi-
neer, the architect, or the district. 19 But all bids or proposals must be
made public after the award of the contract, or within seven days after
the date of final selection of bids or proposals, whichever is later.'
20
The Legislature also changed the law regarding competitive sealed pro-
posals for construction service contracts. 12' The law now requires that a
statement of the selection criteria must be used in the competitive sealed
proposal process.122 The current selection process is identical to that re-
quired for construction managers-at risk and design/build companies.
23
Except as otherwise specifically noted in the law pertaining to competi-
tive purchasing, it is now clear that the Texas Local Government Code
provisions relating to competitive bidding on public works projects do not
apply to the competitive purchasing process for construction services in
school districts.124 The Local Government Code Chapter 271 provisions
do apply if the district chooses to follow a competitive bidding process. 25
School districts are permitted to use job order contracts for minor con-
struction, in addition to minor repair, rehabilitation, or alteration of a
111. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 44.037(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
112. Id. § 44.038(c).
113. See id. § 44.038(e).
114. See id.
115. Id. § 44.038(f).
116. Id.
117. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 44.038(g) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
118. See id. § 44.038(i).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. § 44.039.
122. See id. § 44.039(d).
123. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 44.039 (Vernon Supp. 2000).




facility. 126 Job order contracts may be used for work that is recurrent,
where delivery times are indefinite, and where indefinite quantities or
orders are awarded substantially on the basis of pre-described and pre-
priced activities. 127
F. STUDENTS
It is now a felony to mark graffiti on a school building or on the build-
ings of an institution of higher education, if the amount of loss is less than
$20,000.128 Under House Bill 152, the definition of "school" now in-
cludes private and public elementary or secondary schools. 129
For purposes of school attendance, under House Bill 217,130 school dis-
tricts must still excuse students from attending class to observe religious
holy days (including travel time for that purpose) but can no longer re-
quire a written request to be submitted by the student's parent or guard-
ian before the absence occurs. 31
In House Bill 861,132 the Texas Legislature created a new criminal of-
fense for threatening a child younger than seventeen with imminent bod-
ily injury to coerce, induce, or solicit the child to participate in the
activities of a criminal street gang. 133 Such activity is now a felony. 134 If
the person committing the offense causes bodily injury to a child while
attempting to coerce, induce or solicit the child, the offense is a third
degree felony. 135
To combat the issue of students over the age of eighteen who may en-
roll in high school but then choose not to attend since they no longer fall
under the compulsory education law, House Bill 907136 provides that a
person who voluntarily enrolls in school or attends school after that per-
son's eighteenth birthday must attend school each day for the entire pe-
riod that the program of instruction is offered. 137 A person over the age
of eighteen with more than five unexcused absences in a semester may
have his or her enrollment revoked by the school district for the remain-
der of the school year and may be considered an unauthorized person
when present on school district grounds. 138
A student may now be expelled if, while on school district property or
while attending a school-sponsored or school-related activity on or off
school property, the student intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
126. See id. § 44.041(a).
127. See id. § 44.041.
128. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.08(d)(1), (2) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
129. See id. § 28.08(e)(4).
130. Tex. H.B. 217, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
131. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.087(b) (Vernon 2000).
132. Tex. H.B. 861, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
133. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.015 (Vernon 2000).
134. See id. § 22.015(c).
135. See id.
136. Tex. H.B. 907, 76th Leg., R.S., (1999).
137. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.085(e) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
138. See id.
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bodily injury to a district employee or a district volunteer.139 Under Sen-
ate Bill 260,140 a student may also be expelled if the student commits the
above offense in retaliation for or as a result of the person's employment
or association with the district regardless of where the assault
occurred. 14 1
Senate Bill 858142 requires a school district to provide written notice to
a parent or legal guardian at least once every three weeks or during the
fourth week of each nine-week grading period if a student's performance
is consistently unsatisfactory in a foundation curriculum subject. 143
In Senate Bill 138,144 the State of Texas has now adopted a Texas Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act, which allows a person, including a parent
or a school district employee, to sue a governmental entity, including a
school district, when a law, policy or practice restricts the person's relig-
ious activity. 145 The lawsuit can be brought against an individual acting in
an official capacity. However, school board members and administrators
cannot be held personally liable for any damages. The statute provides a
very broad definition of "religious activities" and defines free exercise of
religion to mean an act that is substantially motivated by a sincere relig-
ious belief.146 It does not require that the act or refusal to act be moti-
vated by a central part or requirement of the belief; it merely requires
that the religious belief be sincere.' 47 In order to impose a restriction on
that belief, the school district must prove a "compelling interest" for its
imposition of a restriction. 148 A successful plaintiff can receive declara-
tory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and reasonable at-
torney's fees plus court costs.149 However, compensatory damages have
been limited by statute to $10,000 for each distinct controversy, regard-
less of the number of members within the religious group who claim the
injury.150 A governmental body receives a measure of safety because the
plaintiff must exhaust his or her administrative remedies by giving the
district notice of the burden and giving the district sixty days to cure the
violation, unless the threat to the person's free exercise of religion is im-
minent and the person did not have knowledge of the burden in time to
reasonably provide notice.' 5' In order to cure a violation, a governing
body can design a remedy that removes the substantial burden; it need
not implement the remedy in the least restrictive manner.1 52 If the gov-
139. See id. § 37.007(b)(3).
140. Tex. S.B. 260, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
141. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.007(d) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
142. Tex. S.B. 858, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
143. See id. § 28.022(a)(3).
144. See Tex. S.B. 138, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
145. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 110.001, et seq. (Vernon Supp. 2000).
146. See id. § 110.001(a)(1).
147. See id. § 110.001.
148. See id. § 110.003.
149. See id. § 110.005.
150. See id.
151. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 110.006 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
152. See id.
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erning body has remedies the burden, then the complainant may not
bring the claim for declaratory or injunctive relief, compensatory dam-
ages, or attorney's fees and costs. 153
The Omnibus Sex Offender Registration and Public Notice Act, House
Bill 2145,154 amended the statutory provisions regarding the public notice
that is provided to a school superintendent or a private school administra-
tor if the victim of a sex offender is a child younger than seventeen years
of age.' 55 A notice requirement has been added if the sex offender is
seventeen or older and is also a student enrolled in a public or private
secondary school. 156 This legislation has also made clear the previously
unspecified responsibilities of a superintendent upon receipt of a sex of-
fender notification; the superintendent must now release the information
in the notice to appropriate school personnel, including peace officers,
security personnel, principals, nurses, and counselors. 157 The person's
full name, numerical physical address, and either a recent photograph of
the person or a website on which the person's photograph is accessible is
now published in the local newspaper. 158
II. 1999 FEDERAL REGULATORY CHANGES AFFECTING
SPECIAL EDUCATION
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") has been in
existence for at least twenty-five years. 159 On June 4, 1997, the IDEA
was reauthorized under Public Law 105-17. One of the main purposes of
the reauthorization was to strengthen the role of parents. Additionally,
the reauthorization was written to ensure students with disabilities access
to the general education curriculum, provide focus for teaching and learn-
ing while reducing unnecessary paperwork requirements, assist educa-
tional agencies in addressing the cost and approving special education
and related services to children with disabilities, provide increased atten-
tion to racial, ethnic, and linguistic diversity to prevent inappropriate
identification and mislabeling, ensure that schools are safe and conducive
to learning, and encourage parents and educators to work out their differ-
ences by using non-adversarial means. 160
Educators reviewed the 1997 revisions to the IDEA and began to learn
to work with the new provisions. However, further guidance was needed
from the Department of Education. It was not until 1999, when the U.S.
Department of Education finally issued the implementing regulations
(the "Regulations") that those who work with the IDEA were able to
153. See id.
154. Tex. H.B. 2145, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
155. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE § 62.03(e) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. § 62.03(f).
159. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (1997).
160. See id. § 1400(c)(5).
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fully analyze the potential ramifications of the new law. 161
Although a complete review of all IDEA Regulatory changes would be
too lengthy for the purposes of this survey, a brief discussion of one of the
most controversial changes in the Regulations is appropriate. Addition-
ally, a brief summary of recent cases interpreting the IDEA is relevant to
an understanding of the consequences of the reauthorization.
The Regulations were intended not only to implement changes made in
the reauthorization of the IDEA in 1997 but also to incorporate many
long-standing interpretations from the Office of Special Education Pro-
gram ("OSEP"), which administers the IDEA.162 As with the previous
regulations, the new Regulations cover a wide area of issues ranging from
general issues (assistive technology, definitions, and related services), to
state and local eligibility (free appropriate public education ("FAPE"),
exceptions to FAPE, methods of ensuring service), services (responsibil-
ity of state education agencies, information regarding Individual Educa-
tion Plans ("IEPs"), children in private schools), and most importantly, to
procedural safeguards. 163 The key controversial changes, which are also
the provisions which have had the most impact on the day-to-day imple-
mentation of the Regulations and the IDEA are provisions addressing
discipline of special education students.
Before the reauthorization of the IDEA and the publication of its Reg-
ulations, school districts operated under the standard that special educa-
tion students could not be removed from their educational placement for
more than ten cumulative days in a school year. 164 Taking a conservative
approach, special education attorneys and educators determined that
placing a student in in-school suspension, in the principal's office for
"cooling off," in out-of-school suspension, and expelling a student all con-
stituted "removals," when counting the ten cumulative days. This inter-
pretation limited school districts' ability to discipline students for
behaviors unrelated to the students' disabilities. Acknowledging these
difficulties, the IDEA and the Regulations allowed school districts more
flexibility in this area.
A child with a disability may be removed for disciplinary reasons from
his or her current educational placement for ten consecutive school days
or less in a single school year; the school district is not required to provide
any services to the child during the first ten days of removal if services
would not be provided to non-disabled children who have been similarly
removed.1 65 For the remainder of the school year, the school district may
continue to remove the child for disciplinary purposes for ten school days
or less at a time, and even if the removals are not a "change in place-
ment" under section 300.519(b), the district must provide services to the
161. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.1 et seq. (1999).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. § 300.121; see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 (1988).
165. See id. § 300.121(d)(1).
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extent necessary to "enable the child to appropriately progress in the gen-
eral curriculum and appropriately advance toward achieving the goals set
out in the child's IEP. ' 166 School personnel determine the appropriate
services needed to meet this standard, in consultation with the child's spe-
cial education teacher.167
But when the school district proposes a disciplinary removal that would
constitute a "change in placement" under section 300.519, the school dis-
trict must perform a "manifestation determination review" ("MDR"). 168
For behaviors that are not determined to be a manifestation of the child's
disability, the school district may impose the same disciplinary conse-
quences as would apply to nondisabled children.1 69 The only exception is
that the school district ensure that the child with disabilities must con-
tinue to receive a FAPE.170 The IEP team must formally meet and deter-
mine which services are necessary to enable the child to appropriately
progress in the general curriculum and to appropriately advance toward
achieving the goals of the child's IEP.171
Extensive litigation is anticipated, as school districts make these deci-
sions, which are, at best, subjective. In particular, questions have already
arisen regarding the determination of what constitutes a "change in
placement," what length of removal counts toward the ten days, and
which school district personnel should conduct the determination regard-
ing a change in placement. But, it is likely that as the litigation evolves,
these issues will be clarified, giving school districts additional guidance
when implementing the IDEA and the Regulations.
In addition to changes in the IDEA and the Regulations, two recent
court decisions have clarified a school district's obligations under the
IDEA. The first highly publicized case involved a dispute over the provi-
sion of related services to a medically fragile student. 172 Specifically, the
issue in Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F. was the
school district's obligation to provide the student with continuous one-on-
one nursing services that the student required in order to remain in
school. 173 The dispute centered on the definition of "related services,"
which expressly excludes "medical services . . . [other than those per-
formed] for diagnostic and evaluation purposes."'1 74 The services re-
quested by the student included manual pumping of an air bag attached
to his tracheotomy tube, urinary bladder catheterization, suctioning of his
tracheotomy tube, and the services of someone familiar with emergency
procedures should the student experience autonomic hyperreflexia (an
166. Id. § 300.121(d)(2)(i).
167. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.121(d)(3)(i) (1999).
168. See id. § 300.523.
169. See id. § 300.121(d)(3)(ii).
170. See id. § 300.121.
171. See id. § 300.121(d)(3)(ii).
172. See Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1999).
173. See id. at 70.
174. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(22) (1997).
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uncontrolled visceral reaction to anxiety or a full bladder).' 75 Despite the
school district's arguments that these services were medical in nature,
that they posed serious concerns regarding the continuous nature of the
care required, and that they presented broader financial concerns, the
Court held that the services requested by the student were required as
"related services" under the IDEA.
Focusing on its decision in Irving Independent School District v. Ta-
tro, 1 76 which required a school district to provide clean intermittent cath-
eterization for a kidney patient, the Court found the medical services
requested by the student should be provided by the school district.177
Specifically, the Court held that: 1) the definition of "related services"
includes those services which may be required to assist a child with a
disability to benefit from special education; 2) the in-school care did not
require the training, knowledge, or judgment of a licensed physician; and
3) the in-school care did not involve any more medical intervention than
the care required under Tatro.178 Additionally, the Court found that a
rule limiting the exclusion of medical services to those services requiring
a physician was reasonable and workable for districts.1 79 The Court reaf-
firmed the finding in Tatro, that, when necessary, the IDEA requires dis-
tricts to hire specially trained personnel to meet disabled students'
needs.' 80 The Supreme Court stated:
This case is about whether meaningful access to the public schools
will be assured, not the level of education that a school must finance
once access is attained. It is undisputed that the services at issue
must be provided if Garret is to remain in school. Under the statute,
our precedent, and the purposes of the IDEA, the District must fund
such "related services" in order to help guarantee that students like
Garret are integrated into the public schools.' 8'
Although school districts recognize and respect the Court's interpreta-
tion and the need to include students with disabilities in the regular edu-
cation environment, this decision has raised serious concerns on the part
of school districts as to their obligations for similar services which may
require other kinds of medical interventions. The Court's decision will
have far-reaching ramifications for school districts both financially and
practically, as qualified personnel must be found to fill the necessary
health services positions.
Another recent case issued by the Fifth Circuit reinforced many school
districts' interpretations of the IDEA.182 School districts face the con-
stant dilemma of proving whether the educational programming provided
175. See Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 70 n.3.
176. 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
177. See id. at 888.
178. Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 75.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 79.
82. See Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2000).
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for a student is appropriate and whether it is reasonably calculated to
provide the student with an educational benefit. The standard under the
IDEA requires school districts to provide students with a "free appropri-
ate public education,"'1 83 tailored to the unique needs of the child, by
means of the child's IEP, also know as the Rowley v. Board of Education
standard. 184
In Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School District v. Michael F.,18 5 the
Fifth Circuit outlined the test required to determine whether school dis-
tricts meet the standard under Rowley: 1) whether the program is individ-
ualized on the basis of the student's assessment and performance; 2)
whether the program is administered in the least restrictive environment;
3) whether the services are provided in a coordinated and collaborative
manner by the key stakeholders; and 4) whether positive academic and
non-academic benefits are demonstrated. 186
Applying the Michael F. factors, the court's decision in Houston Inde-
pendent School District v. Bobby R., provides great insight into what evi-
dence will be sufficient to meet the standards under Rowley and Michael
F. Specifically, the court found that parties challenging the implementa-
tion of an IEP must show more than a de minimis failure to implement all
elements of an IEP.187 To establish a failure to provide FAPE, the parties
must show that the school district failed to implement substantial or sig-
nificant portions of the IEP.188 This distinction is significant in that it
clarifies that, when determining if FAPE is provided, school districts will
be held responsible for material failures, but not minor errors, in an
IEP. 189 Additionally, with regard to the evidence which establishes an
educational benefit, the court found that
a disabled child's development should be measured not by his rela-
tion to the rest of the class, but rather with respect to the individual
student .... [T]he district court was correct to focus on the fact that
Caius's test scores and grade levels in math, written language, pas-
sage comprehension, calculation, applied problems, dictation, writ-
ing, word identification, broad reading, basis reading cluster and
proofing improved during his years in HISD.190
Through this language, the court indicates that the use of only one aca-
demic measure is insufficient to establish whether a student has achieved
an educational benefit. All aspects of the child's progress must be ex-
amined to determine the appropriateness of his or her program and the
183. 458 U.S. 176 (1992).
184. Id. at 346; see Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S. Ct. 3034 91992)
(holding that "[n]oticeably absent from the language of the statute is any substantive stan-
dard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children. Id. at 189.
[Aln 'appropriate education' is provided when personalized educational services are pro-
vided"). Id. at 197. See also Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d at 346.
185. 118 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 1997).
186. See id. at 253.






school district's ability to provide FAPE for the student. These clarifica-
tions will be important in future cases and in the daily implementation of
the IDEA. One of the key issues for school districts in defending a case
under the IDEA is determining the appropriate measure of progress and
the level of compliance with a student's IEP.
As evidenced in this brief summary of the changes in the IDEA and
the Regulations, as well as recent court decisions, the area of special edu-
cation is continually evolving. As school districts and parents work with
the revised law and regulations, they will look to the courts to continue to
provide interpretations of school districts' responsibilities under the
IDEA.
III. CASE LAW AND OPINIONS
A. PERSONNEL ISSUES-FIRST AMENDMENT
Courts have continued to address and refine some long-held concepts
in school law, such as in the personnel area. However, the courts have
also been active in setting some new standards, particularly in the area of
sexual harassment of students by staff and students.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed an employee's First
Amendment claim after a former principal, who was transferred to the
position of assistant principal at a different school, brought a lawsuit
against the school district and the school district's superintendent, alleg-
ing a violation of her First Amendment right to free expression. 191 The
superintendent acted based on his belief that the principal leaked infor-
mation to the community regarding a future use of her campus building
as an alternative school. 192 The court held that the superintendent's al-
leged retaliation against the principal for her perceived public statements
was not a First Amendment violation, where the principal denied making
the statements. 193 The Fifth Circuit further held that the principal's si-
lence on an issue is not protected expression. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that even if the information about the use of the building
constituted a matter of public concern, the former principal did not have
a retaliation claim because she denied being the source of the leak. 194
In Harris v. Victoria ISD,195 a group of teachers sued the school dis-
trict, the superintendent, and members of the board of trustees, claiming
violations of their First Amendment rights because they were transferred
after they expressed concerns about their principal's conduct. 196 After
summary judgment was granted for the defendants, the teachers appealed
191. Jones v. Collins, 132 F.3d 1048, 1053 (5th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, 137 F.3d 1353
(5th Cir. 1998).
192. See id. at 1051.
193. See id. at 1053.
194. See id. at 1054.
195. 168 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc denied, No. 97-41015, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18305 (5th Cir. July 6, 1999), cert. denied sub nom. 120 S. Ct. 533 (1999).
196. See id. at 219.
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to the Fifth Circuit. The Court held that the transfer and reprimand of
teachers constituted an adverse employment action.' 97 The Court then
determined that the teachers' speech was on a matter of public concern,
the teachers' interest in free speech was not outweighed by the school
district's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
formed, individual defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity;
and board members were not entitled to absolute immunity just because
their actions in a grievance hearing were quasi-judicial in nature. 198 Fur-
ther, the Fifth Circuit held that the board's actions could be said to re-
present the district's official policy because of the board's status as a
policymaker for purposes of liability under section 1983.199
An accounting supervisor at the North Forest school district encoun-
tered problems when a new superintendent was hired in 1996.200 The
accounting supervisor was appointed to a newly created position as Di-
rector of Financial Services. Several months later, the director discovered
some financial improprieties and reported them to the Texas Education
Agency ("TEA") and to the District Attorney's office. After the em-
ployee's report, the TEA visited the district to evaluate its fiscal opera-
tions. As a result of that visit, TEA recommended that the district
reorganize the business office. The employee applied for, but was not
promoted to, chief financial officer. He filed suit, claiming a violation of
his First Amendment rights and a violation of the Texas Whistleblower
Act. The Fifth Circuit held that because the committee that hired the
employee who supervised the reorganized business office did not know
about the employee's whistleblowing activities during the committee's
decision-making process, the employee could not establish any causal
connection between his speech and the alleged retaliatory conduct.20 '
The court further held that because the school district was suffering such
severe financial problems, school officials would have taken the same ac-
tion regardless of whether or not the employee had blown the whistle.202
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that the school officials were entitled to
qualified immunity. 203
The case of Madison v. Houston ISD20 4 involved a special education
teacher accused of striking a student with a paddle. When the principal
investigated, he determined that the employee had previously been repri-
manded for improper discipline of students on several other occasions.
197. See id. at 220.
198. See id. at 223-24.
199. See id. at 225.
200. Lukan v. North Forest ISD, 183 F.3d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'd denied, No. 98-
21158 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26266 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 1999); cert. denied sub nom., Lukan
v. Scott, 68 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2000).
201. See id. at 397.
202. See id.
203. Lukan v. North Forest ISD, 183 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'd denied, 1999 US
App LEXIS 26266 (5th Cir. 1999); cert. denied sub nom. Lukan v. Scott, 68 U.S.L.W. 3593
(U.S. Mar. 20, 2000).
204. 47 F.Supp.2d 825, 828 (S.D. Tex. 1999), affd without opinion, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3035 (5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2000).
[Vol. 53
EDUCATION LAW
Therefore, the principal recommended termination of the employee's
contract. The employee claimed that the district terminated his employ-
ment in retaliation for him alerting the news media about problems
within the school where he taught. The Federal District Court deter-
mined that the teacher's report to the news media was not a motivating
factor in the district's decision to terminate the employee.20 5 Rather, the
court held that the school district's belief that the employee improperly
paddled the child after several remediation attempts for inappropriate
discipline was the motivating factor, which was an appropriate reason.20 6
Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the district on
the employee's First Amendment claim.
In yet another First Amendment case, an Alvin ISD teacher became
identified as the one primary source of tension on her campus because of
her confrontational attitude with her peers and her advocacy on behalf of
her son.20 7 Plaintiff continually made complaints such as finding class-
room doors unlocked and finding that student files were misplaced. In
spite of being asked to regularly communicate with the assistant principal
regarding her concerns about her son's education, the teacher continued
her accusatory conduct. In order to avert a morale crisis at the junior
high school, the plaintiff was transferred to the high school and was as-
signed to the alternative education and student suspension center. She
filed a grievance which ultimately resulted in the plaintiff seeking to re-
voke the professional certifications of a dozen school district employees.
After taking a medical leave of absence and having her term contract
nonextended, the employee filed suit in federal court. The court noted
that in order for the employee to show a cause of action based on the
exercise of her First Amendment rights, she must show by a preponder-
ance of evidence that her speech was protected; that she suffered adverse
employment action; and that there was a causal connection between the
protected speech and the adverse employment action. The district court
denied all of the plaintiff's claims and even took the extraordinary action
of informing her that should she file another meritless lawsuit without
compelling new evidence, sanctions would be considered against her.20 8
B. PERSONNEL ISSUES-ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS
After his termination, a state university professor and his wife sued the
University of Texas and three administrators who participated in negative
evaluations of the professor20 9 (which included negative comments in the
professors' tenure file, and repeated recommendations that he should not
be allowed to continue on tenure track). The Texas Supreme Court held
that since the administrators' conduct in negatively evaluating the profes-
205. See id. at 829.
206. See id.
207. Upshaw v. Alvin ISD, 31 F.Supp.2d 553 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
208. See id.
209. Brewerton v. Dalrymple, 997 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1999).
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sor was not extreme and outrageous, a necessary element of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress was eliminated. The court also
held that the wife's derivative loss of consortium claim must fail.210
An employee of the Pasadena ISD was employed by the school district
for thirty-three years without receiving a negative evaluation. 211 In 1994
and 1995, however, he criticized an upcoming bond election favored by
the school board and the superintendent, and supported a candidate run-
ning against an incumbent board member who was facing reelection. In
the summer of 1995, the employee was investigated by a private detec-
tive, was advised to resign and to publicly and privately support the pro-
posed bond election in exchange for a monetary fee and was told that if
he did not agree, he would be reassigned to transportation, food services
or maintenance. The employee refused to sign the agreement and several
days later was reassigned to the newly created position of Associate Su-
perintendent for Project Management and given responsibilities that had
previously been handled, for the most part, by a secretary. He later re-
ceived his first negative evaluation in thirty-three years and was repri-
manded in the evaluation for speaking out on the board election and the
school district's reorganization. After the trial court dismissed the em-
ployee's First Amendment claims, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
court's dismissal, claiming insufficient evidence to perform an appropri-
ate Pickering212 balancing test. However, because the employee's salary
was not reduced when he was demoted, the court ruled that the employee
was not denied due process. Therefore, the case was affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.
In one of the most significant state court decisions regarding teacher
contracts in 1999, the Austin Court of Appeals ruled that a teacher had
no protective property interest in renewal of her term contract. 213 The
court ruled that the employee's one year term contract did not create a
property interest subject to due process protection; but, even if she had a
property interest, she received due process. 214 The court cited the defi-
ciencies noted in the employee's evaluations and growth plans as substan-
tial evidence for the board's decision to not renew her contract. The
court specifically cited the 1993 Texas Supreme Court case of Grounds v.
Tolar ISD,21 5 which held that the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act's re-
quirement that there be pre-established reasons for nonrenewal is an es-
sential characteristic of a property interest which warrants due process
210. See id. at 216.
211. Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 1999).
212. Pickering v. Board of Educ. Of TWP High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968).
The balancing test involves a weighing of the interests of the [employee] as a
citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern [against] the interests
of the government, as an employer; in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.
Id.
213. Stratton v. Austin ISD, 8 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet. h.).
214. See id.
215. 856 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. 1993)
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protections.2 16 However, the court noted that, in 1995, the Texas Legisla-
ture enacted section 21.204(e) of the Texas Education Code, which specif-
ically states that a teacher does not have a property interest in a contract
beyond its term.217
C. PERSONNEL ISSUES-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
In a much anticipated case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
school district athletic trainers are exempt from the overtime provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").218 In 1997, a federal district
court had determined that athletic trainers employed by the San Antonio
ISD were not "professionals" and, therefore, were not exempt from the
overtime provisions of the FLSA. The Fifth Circuit, however, ruled that
the trainers satisfied the "learned" requirement, because they must take a
specific number of specialized courses related to sports medicine and ath-
letic training.219 Further, the trainers must obtain a university degrees
and secure training in subjects like human anatomy, physiology, and
sports medicine; and the trainers' work also requires the exercise of judg-
ment and discretion. 220 The court further held that because there was no
evidence that a physician supervised athletic trainers' activities at all
times, the trainers were working under the exercise of their own judg-
ment and discretion. Therefore, the court held that because trainers are
considered "professionals" for purposes of the wage and hour laws, they
are not entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of
forty hours per week.
In another employee compensation decision, a retired principal of
community services for the Houston Independent School District brought
an action for back pay against the school district, alleging that she was
compensated at an improper rate for thirteen years.221 The retired princi-
pal had continually complained about her salary and ultimately received
a salary increase. The Court of Appeals in Houston held that the super-
intendent's memoranda, district salary manuals and letters recom-
mending higher compensation did not constitute "state law" so as to
create a protectable property interest in the allegedly correct compensa-
tion.222 The court further held that a claim for back pay was essentially a
claim for monetary damages, which is not recoverable under the Texas
Constitution. 223
216. See id.
217. Id. (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.204(e) (Vernon Supp. 2000)).
218. Owsley v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'd de-
nied, 199 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2000).
219. See id. at 525.
220. See id.
221. Jackson v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1999, no pet.).





In Lamar University v. Doe,224 minor children were photographed and
videotaped in explicit sexual poses in a university student's dormitory
room. The parents filed suit against the university, claiming that the uni-
versity had knowledge that the student was a pedophile, yet continued to
rent a room to him. The Court of Appeals held that the parents failed to
allege that the injuries in question arose from the use of "tangible real
property" (specifically, the dormitory) within the meaning of the Tort
Claims Act, and therefore vacated and dismissed the action.225
A college student, who was accidentally stabbed during the production
of a school play, brought suit against Texas A&M University. 226 The
Court of Appeals held that neither the drama director and his wife nor
the professors who acted as faculty advisors to the drama club were uni-
versity employees for purposes of establishing the university's liability
under the Tort Claims Act. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court judgment in favor of the student.
A health club owner was allowed to open a health club on campus and
to charge all students a fee to use the club. 227 Ultimately, when the busi-
ness failed, the health club owner sued the State, the Texas A&M Univer-
sity, its board of regents, and its president, under the Tort Claims Act, for
negligence and gross negligence. The Court of Appeals held that the uni-
versity's action in allowing the owner to open the club on campus was a
governmental function, not a proprietary function, for which the univer-
sity and its individuals did not have liability.228 The Court of Appeals
further held that the financial loss that the owner experienced in connec-
tion with the club was not a "personal injury" as required under the Tort
Claims Act.229
E. STUDENTS-RELIGION
As in previous years, some significant issues related to students and
religion in public schools were in the forefront of the news. In 1999, the
Fifth Circuit held that a school district policy which permits students to
deliver sectarian and proselytizing prayers violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. 230 The Fifth Circuit further held that the
Free Speech Clause's prohibition against view point discrimination did
224. Lamar Univ. v. Doe, 971 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998), no pet.
225. Id. "Property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition
that makes the injury possible." Id. at 196 (citing Dallas County Mental Health et al. v.
Bossley, et al., 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex. 1998)).
226. Texas A&M Univ. v. Bishop, 996 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1999).
227. Hencerling v. Texas A&M Univ., 986 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1999), pet. denied.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 374.
230. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'g denied, 171
F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 494 (1999).
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not protect the policy from challenge under the Establishment Clause.231
Another version of the school district's policy which only allowed stu-
dents to give nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayers at graduation cere-
monies violated the Establishment Clause when that policy was extended
to permit such prayers over the public address system at football games.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that football games are not solemn and seri-
ous enough occasions for such a religious message. 232 The Santa Fe ISD
case was recently upheld the U.S. Supreme Court.233
In another case involving students and religion, public school students
in the Beaumont ISD challenged the constitutionality of the school dis-
trict's "clergy in the schools" volunteer counseling program, which
brought clergy members into the schools to provide nonsectarian counsel-
ing to students.2 34 The court held that the program violated the Estab-
lishment clause under the Lemon v. Kurtzmann,235 test because the
program has the primary effect of advancing religion and constitutes ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion. The court also held that
the program was unconstitutional under the "coercion" test and the "en-
dorsement" test of the Establishment Clause. The Fifth Circuit further
held that the program was not neutral as to religion, since only members
of the clergy were invited to participate as counselors.
A high school student challenged the school district's policy of requir-
ing transfer students from non-accredited private or home schools to pass
proficiency exams in order to receive high school credit toward gradua-
tion.2 36 The student alleged that such a policy violated her free exercise
rights under the First Amendment. The Federal District Court held that
the policy was a valid religion-neutral policy of general applicability
which did not burden the free exercise of religion. The District Court
applied the rational basis analysis in reviewing the equal protection chal-
lenge and determined that the challenged policy was rational and related
to a legitimate state interest in setting uniform public school advance-
ment and graduation requirements.
Finally, in Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education,237 parents
of public school children sued to enjoin the school board for mandating
that a disclaimer be read immediately before the teaching of evolution in
all primary and secondary grades. The Fifth Circuit held that the dis-
claimer did not further the board's articulated objective of encouraging
informed freedom of belief or critical thinking by students. The court fur-
ther held that the disclaimer did further the purpose of disclaiming a spe-
cific belief and reducing any offense to the sensibilities of any student or
parent, and that those were permissible secular objectives for purposes of
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 147 L..Ed. 295 (2000).
234. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 1999).
235. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
236. Hubbard v. Buffalo ISD, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
237. 201 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2000).
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the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test. However, the court ruled
that the primary effect of the disclaimer was to protect and maintain a
particular religious viewpoint, which violated the second prong of the
Lemon test, as well as the endorsement test, the third prong. The policy
was, therefore, ruled unconstitutional.2 38
F. STUDENTS-SEXUAL HARASSMENT
One of the most significant legal issues in school law the past few years
has been the developing law with regard to students who are sexually
harassed or sexually abused. In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Gebser
v. Lago Vista Independent School District,239 ruled that there is no private
right of action for monetary damages when a teacher engages in a sexual
relationship with a student, if the school district lacks actual notice and is
not "deliberately indifferent." Gebser involved a male teacher who had
sexual relations with a female high school student. The student did not
report the relationship to school district officials, but a police officer dis-
covered the couple engaging in sexual relations off school grounds and
arrested the teacher. Ultimately, the school board fired the teacher and
the Texas Education Agency revoked his teaching certificate. The stu-
dent sued under Title IX. The Fifth Circuit determined that the school
board was not vicariously liable because the board was not aware of the
relationship. The Supreme Court affirmed that, without deliberate indif-
ference in the face of actual notice, there was no implied right of action
under Title IX. Conversely, of course, if a school district acts with delib-
erate indifference once someone with authority has actual notice of em-
ployee-on-student sexual harassment, a cause of action could be viable.240
The United States Supreme Court, in 1999, then addressed student-on-
student sexual harassment in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educa-
tion.241 A fifth grade female student sued the school district because of a
series of sexually harassing actions taking against her by a fellow student.
Although she reported the young man's actions to her teacher and, ulti-
mately, to the principal, no action was taken which corrected the
problems. The Court held that a private cause of action for damages may
lie against a school board under Title IX in cases of known student-on-
student sexual harassment, where the district acts with deliberate indiffer-
ence and the harassment is so severe and pervasive that it effectively bars
the student's access to an educational opportunity or benefit. The Court
further held that such liability under Title IX is limited to circumstances
where the school district exercises substantial control over the harasser
and the context in which the known harassment occurs. The Court at-
tempted to make it clear that monetary damages would not be available
merely for student acts of teasing and name calling, even where such acts
238. Id.
239. 524 U.S. 274, 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
240. Id.
241. 526 U.S. 629, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999).
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target students of one gender or another.242
In one of the first cases interpreting Davis, the Beaumont Court of
Appeals ruled that a male student's act of touching a female student's leg
in class is not actionable under Title IX because the harassment was not
so severe, pervasive, or objectively offensive that it could be said to de-
prive the student of access to educational opportunities or benefits.243
The Court further held that, the District, the teacher and the principal
were not liable under section 1983 unless they were deliberately indiffer-
ent to the extent that they encouraged the specific incident of misconduct
or in some other way participated in it, or unless they authorized, ap-
proved, or knowingly acquiesced in the harasser's conduct.
G. STUDENTS-DISCIPLINE
Students in the Austin ISD were suspended for three days each for
wearing shirts that were "maroonish" or "reddish" and were alleged to
contain gang insignia, indicating that the students were engaging in gang
related activities. 244 The students sued, claiming that they did not receive
procedural due process because they were suspended from school with-
out a hearing. The district and the principal filed motions for summary
judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, which were denied. The
Fifth Circuit held that the parents' arguments to the principal that their
children were not gang members was insufficient procedural due process
for the students to have the opportunity to explain the students' versions
of the facts. 245 The court held that, under some circumstances, a parent
may serve as an acceptable surrogate for a student and explain his child's
version of the facts.246 However, the fact that the students were not al-
lowed to tell their side of the story violated due process.247 On rehearing,
the court again addressed the issue regarding when a parent can speak on
behalf of his/her child. The court clarified that its holding was that proce-
dural due process is satisfied when there is a meaningful opportunity to
tell the child's side of the story. The court further held that an adminis-
trator speaking with a parent will not create a meaningful opportunity to
tell the child's side of the story in every case. The Fifth Circuit further
held that, in this case, when parents merely denied the conduct which
their children were alleged to have committed, due process was not
satisfied.
A graduate student who failed to obtain his doctoral degree brought
state court action against Texas Women's University (TWU) for an al-
leged violation of due process. The student, Wheeler, alleged that he was
242. Id.
243. Mosley v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 997 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1999, no pet.).
244. Meyer v. Austin ISD, 161 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, 167 F.3d 887 (5th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1806 (1999), reh'g denied, 120 S. Ct. 15 (1999).
245. See id. at 274.




falsely accused of cheating, which resulted in inadequate grades, a puni-
tive remediation plan, denial of participation in an internship program,
and his ultimate dismissal from the program. He claimed that TWU
never gave him a hearing on the cheating allegations. In Wheeler v.
Miller,248 a TWU psychology professor testified to testing irregularities
committed by plaintiff Wheeler. When the same student applied to the
school's psychology Ph.D. program, the same teacher voted against his
admission to the program, expressing concerns about his performance in
her class. After failing several courses, and his first and second set of oral
examinations, and failing to comply with the remediation plan, the stu-
dent was dismissed from the graduate program. The Fifth Circuit Court
held that the University's dismissal of the graduate student from a doc-
toral program was academic, not disciplinary, in nature, for purposes of
the student's procedural due process claim. Therefore, the graduate stu-
dent's dismissal did not violate his right to procedural due process, where
the University's decision was careful and deliberate, following a pro-
tracted series of steps to rate the student's academic performance, inform
him of his weak performance, and provide him with a specially tailored
remediation program in light of his performance. The court further held
that the communications by the University's faculty members to other
faculty members, and to a school district offering an internship to the
graduate student, were subject to "qualified privilege" as communications
made to persons having the corresponding interest or duty. The court
held that the privilege was not defeated on the grounds of actual malice,
absent evidence that the statements were false or made with acknowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 249
Parents of Dallas ISD students, who received corporal punishment,
filed suit against the former superintendent, a Principal, and two teachers,
alleging that their children were excessively disciplined while in the mid-
dle school. The Court of Appeals in Dallas held that use of a wooden
paddle to discipline students does not violate any substantive due process
rights.250
In Aledo v. Reese,251 a principal expelled a student for bringing a gun
on school property. The superintendent then modified the discipline, al-
lowing the student to attend evening alternative education program
(AEP) classes. A local district court judge issued a temporary injunction
requiring the student to participate in regular school functions and clas-
ses. The Court of Appeals held that the transfer of the student to evening
AEP classes was not an expulsion from the student's regular campus
within the Gun-Free Schools Act and that the board's decision to uphold
the transfer to AEP was final and not appealable, thereby vacating the
injunction.252
248. 168 F. 3rd 241 (5th Cir. 1999).
249. Id.
250. Johnson v. Resendez, 993 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. granted).
251. 987 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).




In Texas v. Lesage,253 an African immigrant of Caucasian descent ap-
plied to the University of Texas (UT) for admission into a counseling
psychology graduate program. Although receiving over 200 applications,
the University only allowed admission to approximately 20 students. The
department considered the race of the applicant in its decisionmaking.
Lesage filed suit, alleging that by maintaining a race-conscious admissions
process, the University violated the 14th Amendment. The University
was able to show, that even if the school's admission process had not
taken race into consideration, Lesage would not have been admitted, be-
cause a large number of students had higher grade point averages, higher
test scores, or both, than Lesage. The Fifth Circuit rejected UT's argu-
ments, stating that when an applicant is rejected for reasons based on
race, the applicant suffers an implied injury. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court overruled the Fifth Circuit and held that even if UT had considered
an impermissible reason in making a decision to deny admission to a stu-
dent, it could avoid liability by showing it would have made the same
decision without the prohibited consideration.25 4 However, the Supreme
Court cautioned that this only applies in cases in which a plaintiff chal-
lenges a single governmental action, not an ongoing pattern of
discrimination.255
IV. CONCLUSION
As always, lobbyists and litigators are currently at work seeking a myr-
iad of changes to school laws and to court cases interpreting school laws.
As a result, school attorneys on both sides of the bar will always be stu-
dents themselves, updating and revising their knowledge of the vast num-
ber of issues involved in school law. Teachers and Administrators are,
therefore, wise to seek the advice of learned legal counsel when their
actions and decisions extend beyond curriculum and instruction, into le-
gal rights and responsibilities.
253. Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
254. Texas v. Lesage, 120 S.Ct. 467, 469 (1999).
255. See id.
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